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Abstract
The democratic accountability of policymaking institutions which are auto-
nomous within delegated mandates has not received as much attention as their
independence. We analyze in a theoretical model the effects of accountability in
the form of possible overriding of economic policy decisions by the government un-
der different degrees of independence of expert committees conducting monetary
and fiscal policy. The equilibrium outcomes of such alternative institution-design
frameworks are compared according to key macroeconomic performance criteria.
Our results stress the trade-off between anchoring inflation expectations on target
and output stabilization that is not solved with accountability.
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Non-technical Summary
Whereas the independence of monetary and, to a lesser extent, fiscal policy has received
considerable attention, the implications of complementing it with democratic account-
ability of the corresponding autonomous policymaking institutions has not been much
studied. In an optimization-based theoretical model, we analyze the effects of such ac-
countability in the form of possible overriding by the government of economic policy
decisions delegated to two committees of experts with mandates in the monetary and
fiscal areas, respectively. Because accountability is only reasonable if the institution to
be made responsible is sufficiently autonomous in the first place, we allow for different
degrees of independence and interaction of the appointed committees, each taken in its
entirety as a policymaking unit or agent, and the elected government, as principal.
The equilibrium outcomes of these alternative institution-design frameworks are then
compared and ranked according to key macroeconomic performance criteria such as infla-
tion expectations, inflation, output and the budget deficit. Our results stress the trade-off
between anchoring inflation expectations on target and output stabilization that is not
solved with accountability. What we can conclude is that if the priority is to manage
inflation and inflation expectations, a society should opt for independent monetary pol-
icy which is not constrained by the threat of its decisions being overridden, no matter
whether fiscal policy is similarly independent or fully dependent. If, on the other hand,
a society would prefer to mitigate the fluctuations of output and employment, policy-
making by expert committees should be additionally constrained either by accountability
mechanisms such as override clauses or similar in effects or by permitting instrument but
not goal independence as, for instance, in popular inflation targeting regimes of monetary
policy.
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1 Motivation
The purpose of this paper is to address a central question in institution design with direct
implications for policymaking: How are different degrees of independence of monetary
and fiscal policies affected in influencing macroeconomic outcomes when complemented
with accountability? A particular novelty of our approach is that, following proposals
notably by Wyplosz (2005), we set to explore alternative social arrangements that dele-
gate to independent but accountable non-elected expert committees both monetary and
fiscal policy implementation. Such institutional mechanisms are theoretically appeal-
ing because of their potential to enhance policy credibility and effectiveness compared
to the situation where elected fiscal authorities and governments induce the well-known
problems of dynamic inconsistency, inflationary bias and political business cycles. More
precisely, in a way symmetric to an appointed independent but accountable Monetary
Policy Committee (MPC) implementing a mandate delegated by law, we incorporate an
analogous independent but accountable Fiscal Policy Committee (FPC), with a corre-
sponding mandate in the fiscal policy area.
Our set-up builds upon the existing literature, both traditional, and mostly ad-hoc,
and modern, and partly microfounded. There are two instruments at disposal, the in-
terest rate to conduct monetary policy and the consolidated government budget deficit
to conduct fiscal policy. Each implementing authority is assigned or chooses a target,
and actions are potentially, but not necessarily, coordinated. There are three goals to
achieve at a social level, an output, an inflation and a public deficit target. We then
consider alternative institutional frameworks for macroeconomic policymaking, spanning
different degrees of independence without or with accountability modeled as an override
clause which the government may implement or not. Independence and accountability
are, thus, both defined with respect to the government.1 The government, being the prin-
cipal, grants independence to the fiscal and/or monetary authority. These institutions,
as agents, are accountable within their mandate for the degree of freedom each of them
is allowed in conducting the respective policies. Our conceptual and modeling approach
builds upon some related work, most directly on Lohmann (1992), Dixit and Lambertini
(2003), Demertzis, Hughes Hallet and Viegi (2004), Wyplosz (2005), Castellani and De-
brun (2005), Mihov and Sibert (2006), Hughes Hallet and Libich (2006), Mihailov (2006)
and Ullrich (2007).
The huge theoretical and empirical literature on optimal monetary policy has gen-
erally established that a more autonomous central bank tends to lead to a lower actual
inflation, on average. However, there have also been claims against too much central bank
independence, e.g., for reasons of unaccountability that is not acceptable in a democracy.
Fischer (1994) and Debelle and Fischer (1994) have first argued that instrument inde-
pendence coupled with goal dependence – specified by Svensson (1997) and Herrendorf
(1998) as an inflation targeting framework, whereby the government delegates the refer-
1Which we would identify throughout with the parliament and society.
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ence interest-rate setting to the central bank or an MPC but retains the quantification of
the numerical inflation goal for itself – is the socially optimal institutional arrangement to
formulate and implement monetary policy in a democratic society. This type of monetary
regime has been eloquently qualified by Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) as ”constrained
discretion”, again in an inflation targeting context. Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (2002)
have further emphasized that such a democratic approach to the conduct of monetary
policy would require augmented responsibility of the central bank for its actions as well
as accountability to the government and/or to the parliament. An essential dimension
of accountability is transparency, in the sense that it is a necessary precondition for any
form of a wider, non-secretive accountability to be effectively implemented. Accountabil-
ity preconditioned by transparency also has the potential to solve the private information
problem identified by Canzoneri (1985) when central bank discretion is optimal.
As far as optimal fiscal policy is concerned, few clear and general results seem to
be supported theoretically or empirically on a broad basis, no matter that a number of
institutional regulations stipulate certain restrictions on fiscal discretion, e.g., the Maas-
tricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact in the EMU or the ”golden rule” in
the UK. As in monetary policy, the trade-off between value judgement and specialized
knowledge plays a crucial role in delegating fiscal policy to an independent institution
(Calmfors 2003). If the effects of fiscal policy affect the whole society and expertise plays
a crucial role, fiscal policy can be delegated because democratic accountability is not the
main objective (Blinder 1997, 121). Fiscal policy as stabilization policy is characterized
by technical knowledge, not so much by judgment as, e.g., redistribution (Calmfors 2003,
334). Therefore, stabilization can be delegated, whereas all other areas such as redistri-
bution and provision of public goods should not be delegated. However, the separation
of these tasks is not as easy as theoretical models might suggests because fiscal policy
touches the core of the political decision process (Buti, Eijffinger, and Franco 2003, 15).
With respect to both monetary and fiscal policy considered jointly in their interde-
pendence, major earlier work follows the optimization-based Ramsey (1927) approach2
or relates to the fiscal theory of the price level.3 Another strand derives from the game-
theoretic literature on strategic interaction, policy conflict, coordination failures and the
need for coordinated actions if policy effectiveness is to be increased, e.g., in Nordhaus
(1994). It then extends into the more recent research on the design of optimal incentive
schemes, which could be thought of as contracts or institutions. Separation and delega-
tion of powers from a principal to an agent and the related incentive-compatibility design
and enforceability with view to some social optimum have been the key issues of focus in
that strand, and we here contribute further in this particular direction.
Whereas independence has received much attention in the academic literature, ac-
countability is a concept that is not yet clearly defined, especially in theoretical work.
2E.g., Lucas and Stokey (1983), Chari and Kehoe (1999), Benigno and Woodford (2003), Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2004 a, b).
3Notably, with Ricardian equivalence, McCallum and Nelson (2006) have claimed that monetary-fiscal
coordination does not matter at all.
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Following essentially Lohmann (1992), we model accountability as an override clause
where the government is able to change committee decisions according to its preferences
following large shocks; yet in normal times, a conservative central banker conducts mon-
etary policy according to her own preferences. Other approaches to incorporate account-
ability into a formal set-up certainly exist. Briault et al. (1997) analyze the literature on
central bank independence with regard to its implications for accountability. In Walsh
(2003), accountability bears a close relationship to independence. Accountability arises
if “the central bank is subject to pressures attributed to exogenous variation in political
support for greater economic expansion” (Walsh 2003). Another possibility to explicitly
model accountability is to equate accountability with cooperation (Demertzis, Hughes-
Hallet, and Viegi 1998). Castellani (2002) investigates accountability that is also modeled
as ex post political intervention. Hughes Hallet and Libich (2006) define accountability in
an encompassing way, as the final responsibility of monetary policy, and emphasize goal
independence. Accountability is introduced as the punishability of the central banker fol-
lowing deviations of inflation from target. This modeling is in line with a linear contract,
as in Svensson (1997).
Our major findings complement and extend the earlier literature. We compare the
equilibrium outcomes of alternative policy frameworks and rank them according to key
macroeconomic performance criteria such as inflation expectations, inflation, output and
the budget deficit. Our results stress the trade-off between anchoring inflation expecta-
tions on target and output stabilization that is not moderated with accountability. We
conclude that if the priority is to manage inflation and inflation expectations, a society
should opt for independent monetary policy which is not constrained by the threat of its
decisions being overridden, no matter whether fiscal policy is similarly independent. If,
on the other hand, a society would prefer to mitigate the fluctuations of output and em-
ployment, policymaking by expert committees should be additionally constrained either
by accountability mechanisms such as override clauses or similar in effects or by some
form of constrained discretion limiting independence such as goal dependence.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section specifies our basic model, defining
precisely the notions of independence and accountability, the alternative mandates of the
institutions responsible for macroeconomic management, and the economic environment.
Section 3 discusses our main results, first without accountability and then with account-
ability. Concluding remarks are offered in section 4. Finally, Appendix A presents the
solutions of our model which arise from the optimization of the relevant authorities under
the various policy regimes considered, and Appendix B collects summary tables of these
regimes and their rankings across the key variables of interest.
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2 The Basic Model
We set up a model of the relationships among a principal, the Government (denoted
by a G-superscript), and its two agents, the MPC (M -superscript) and the FPC (F -
superscript).4 The objective functions of the expert committees reflect independence and
accountability issues. Independence is granted with regard to the degree the monetary
or fiscal authority can set its own targets and follow its own preferences. Alternative
institution-design regimes between the extremes of complete freedom of action and full
dependence of both authorities are also theoretically formulated along these lines. Ac-
countability is modeled as the possibility of overriding committee decisions that would
imply costs for the Government specific to each regime and, thus, prevent frequent over-
riding.
2.1 The Target System and Sharing of Power
Assuming additive separability of a quadratic loss function for each player, rational ex-
pectations and perfect information, our benchmark is the case of joint optimization with
regard to the three objectives, output, inflation, and the public-sector budget deficit,
conducted by the Government. Its loss function is written as:5
LG =
γGy
2
(
y − y∗,G)2 + γGpi
2
(
pi − pi∗,G)2 + γGd
2
(
d− d∗,G)2 , (1)
where y is the realized output level, pi denotes the inflation rate, and d is some measure
of the government budget deficit; γGj , for j = y, pi, d, are the preference ”weights” and an
asterisk denotes target levels of the respective variables.
By contrast, we assume that with separation of powers our three players are assigned
different prerogatives and minimize the following institution-specific loss functions. The
elected Government, being representative of the public, minimizes (1) again. But the
difference now is a (constant) cost term made explicit further down and capturing the
fact that the Government would only be able to determine economic policy if it overrides
committee decisions. This overriding as a form of accountability comes at some cost
because delegation of economic policy to an independent agency has been made in the
first place. Overriding committee decisions would call for a public procedure that results
in costs for the Government because it deviates from its initial delegation decision.6
Whereas the preferences of the MPC and the FPC constitute the reference for determining
the advantage of delegating monetary and fiscal policy to the appointed experts, the
4Each of these three policymaking units is considered as a whole, i.e., in its entirety. We, thus, do not
address here aspects of structure and configuration of decision power: neither within the committees, as
much of the literature on MPCs has done, nor within the Government.
5The usual discount factor parameter β in dynamic models is eliminated from further consideration
in our static framework, as in most of the related literature.
6We assume that accountability always requires, hence, always implies transparency. Therefore, and
without loss of generality, we fix the degree of transparency to be full, or – which is an alternative
interpretation – any constant amount necessary to implement efficient monitoring and, thus, enforce
accountability.
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Government delivers the reference point for dependent policymaking in accordance with
the literature. Moreover, the Government is the ultimate institution to hold the MPC
and the FPC accountable in our model.
For the monetary authority, the MPC, we assume a quadratic loss function that is
standard in the literature:
LM =
γMpi
2
(pi − pi∗,M)2 + γ
M
y
2
(y − y∗,M)2. (2)
Finally, for the fiscal authority, the FPC, we have in a symmetric fashion:
LF =
γFd
2
(d− d∗,F )2 + γ
F
y
2
(y − y∗,F )2. (3)
We assume that the primary goal for the MPC is to keep inflation on target. Output
stabilization also plays some role but receives a lower weight in the loss function. The
deficit is not a concern for monetary policy. Therefore we have γMpi > γ
M
y . In a similar
way, the FPC is mostly concerned with having the deficit on target, γFd > γ
F
y ; it also cares
about output, but not about inflation. Naturally, the committees give a higher absolute
and relative weight to their primary goal compared to the Government:
γMpi > γ
G
pi ,
γMpi
γMy
>
γGpi
γGy
and γFd > γ
G
d ,
γFd
γFy
>
γGd
γGy
.
To derive our theoretical results, we further assume that the MPC and the FPC, being
non-elected policy institutions consisting of experts, do not have an overambitious output
target. Rather, they pursue a policy that brings output to its ”normal” (or ”natural”)
level, y∗,M = y∗,F = yN . We then denote pi∗,M = pi∗ and d∗,F = d∗ to simplify notation.
However, the Government has an output target that is higher than the normal level,
reflecting what we would call a “re-election concern”, y∗,G > yN . This translates into the
inflation and budget deficit targets too, pi∗,G > pi∗ and d∗,G > d∗.7
2.2 The Monetary Authority
The MPC is independent if it can conduct monetary policy free of constraints and influ-
ence from the government, parliament or interest groups (see, e.g., de Haan and Eijffinger
2000). To operationalize independence into a theoretical model, we follow the main-
stream (New Keynesian or Neo-Wicksellian) monetary policy literature in assuming that
the MPC optimizes an objective function with respect to the interest rate. Under partial
independence, it is forced to take the preferences and the objectives of the Government
into account, because independence is granted from the Government. This is modeled by
7“Coordination” only arises in two senses in our model: (i) if the government is in charge of fiscal
and monetary policy; (ii) insofar the targets of the two committees are assumed the same while their
preference weights differ, which appears more realistic given the fact that monetary and fiscal authorities
communicate and coordinate at an expert level frequently enough. In all other cases, the policies are not
coordinated.
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a weighting, 0 ≤ θM ≤ 1, between the objective functions of the MPC and the Govern-
ment. Such a formulation allows to capture various degrees of instrument (in)dependence
in addition to goal (in)dependence, and is written into the MPC’s objective function as:
ZM = θMLG + (1− θM)LM . (4)
If θM = 0, the MPC is granted complete (instrument and goal) independence, because it
can determine the interest rate according to its own objective function, that is, without
taking the preferences and targets of the Government into account. If θM = 1, the MPC
is instrument- as well as goal-dependent, i.e., operating with no discretion at all and,
effectively, suppressed as institution.
Accountability of the expert committees requires that each of them is responsible for
the process and the results of its policy and is able to explain its actions. In the following
analysis accountability is justified from a democratic point of view and not because of
economic necessity. Accountability also includes mechanisms to sanction the behavior
of the committees. As mentioned, democratic accountability can take on many different
forms. For simplicity, we adopt the modeling shortcut in Lohmann (1992) and restrict our
analysis to an ex post overriding of committee decisions by the Government. In case of
overriding MPC’s decision, the Government would step in and put through its preferred
inflation rate by setting the nominal interest rate at the required level. Therefore, we can
write accountability as:
WM = α(LG + CM) + (1− α)ZM (5)
=
[
θM +
(
1− θM)α]LG + (1− α) (1− θM)LM + αCM ,
where α = 1 if the MPC is overridden and cannot implement its desired inflation rate.
In this case, the Government holds the monetary committee accountable and decides
about inflation. The Government’s preferences and targets receive a weight in the objec-
tive function that is higher than in the case of independent but unaccountable monetary
committee summarized by equation (4). If the MPC is overridden and forced to imple-
ment the inflation rate preferred by the Government, the latter would incur a cost CM .
With α = 0, the MPC can implement its preferred inflation rate and will not be held
accountable by having its decisions overridden.
2.3 The Fiscal Authority
Whereas independence of monetary policy from government influence is well established,
the idea of fiscal policy independence is not equally developed in the literature. This is
not least because of the distributive effects fiscal policy exerts. These effects call for ex
ante democratic control. However, as Wyplosz (2005) argues, the determination of the
fiscal deficit can be delegated to an independent agency, since it does not differ much
in its distributive effects from the determination of the interest rate by monetary policy.
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Following this argumentation, we assume a framework where fiscal policy can be delegated
to an expert committee in the same way as monetary policy. Therefore, the objective
function of the FPC resembles that of the MPC, and the degree of independence is again
captured by a weighting, 0 ≤ θF ≤ 1, between the objective function of the Government
and that of the FPC:
ZF = θFLG + (1− θF )LF , (6)
where θF = 0 results in complete (instrument and goal) independence of the FPC, while
θF = 1 yields the opposite extreme with a completely dependent fiscal policy. As with the
MPC, the FPC is held accountable by the Government. If the fiscal committee sets the
deficit in a way that its actual value deviates to a large extent from the deficit preferred
by the Government, the latter will step in and override the decision of the FPC. By
analogy with the implementation of monetary policy, we then have
W F = α(LG + CF ) + (1− α)ZF (7)
=
[
θF +
(
1− θF )α]LG + (1− α) (1− θF )LF + αCF ,
where α = 0 if the expert committee conducts fiscal policy, and α = 1 if the Government
overrides FPC’s decision and determines a deficit level according to its own preferences.
2.4 The Economy and the Conduct of Macroeconomic Policy
The economy can be described by an aggregate demand and an aggregate supply function
in a standard way.8 Demand depends on the real interest rate that is determined by the
nominal interest rate, i, the instrument of monetary policy, and the instrument of fiscal
policy, the deficit d. The expected value of the demand shock, ², is zero. Supply deviates
from the “normal” output level, yN , if inflation, pi, and inflation expectations, pie, do not
match. Again, the expected value of the supply shock, ε, is zero. Imposing equilibrium
of demand and supply determines the output level:
yD = ad− b(i− pie) + ², (8)
yS = yN + c(pi − pie) + ε,
y ≡ yD = yS,
with a > 0, b > 0, c > 0 all positive coefficients which could be, themselves, further
defined in terms of underlying deeper parameters that have parallels to the New Keynesian
or Neo-Wicksellian microfounded model for monetary policy analysis, with yN the flexible-
price level of output (see, e.g., Woodford, 2003).
We assume that, similarly to Lohmann (1992) and Mihov and Sibert (2006), overriding
would occur in case of large supply shocks. More importantly, following Lohmann (1992)
and Hughes Hallet and Libich (2006), among others, the MPC and the FPC in our set-
8Reminiscent of Sargent and Wallace (1975) and the huge literature they generated.
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up take into account the possibility of their decisions being overridden when optimizing
their behavior only via inflation expectations. We model the Government’s incentives
to override endogenously, along the following lines. As explained, the Government can
determine the inflation rate, the output gap and the deficit according to its targets and
preferences by minimizing its own loss function. Any deviation of the instruments from
the corresponding optimal levels will result in a deviation from the desired minimal loss,
regardless whether this deviation is positive or negative because of the quadratic form.
The levels of the variables that are determined by the committees will result in a higher
loss in any case since the monetary and fiscal policymakers optimize each according to
its own loss function. Therefore, the Government would override the committee decisions
in every event if there are no costs to do so. If there are costs of overriding, the gain
of doing so and choosing the variables according to the Government’s own loss function
compared to the loss realized in case of committee decisions has to be higher than the
costs:
LG (ycom, picom, dcom)− LG (yG, piG, dG) > CM + CF > 0. (9)
Note that each of the arguments in the two loss functions above is endogenous and depends
further on the materialized cost push shock ε, given the probability α implied ex ante
for the occurrence of overriding ex post in any particular institution-design framework
with accountability. We could have written that as j = j (ε;α) for j = y, pi, d under
the two possibilities captured by the superscripts com (no overriding) and G (overriding)
in (9), which we do not do to keep the notation less complicated. Since among the
deeper determinants of the endogenous arguments of the above loss functions are also
the various target values, in addition to ε and α, and since these constant targets are
not subject to optimization ex post, as assumed, the only magnitude that changes in
every state of nature and influences the relative loss in (9) is the supply shock ε. The
larger its positive or negative realization, the larger the deviation of the macroeconomic
variables determined via the respective instruments by the committees from the level the
Government would have chosen. There would, thus, be a threshold of the supply shock
|ε| where it equates the loss of the Government, LG (yG, piG, dG), including the costs of
overriding, CM + CF , and the loss of the Government conditioned on the decisions of
the committees, LG (ycom, picom, dcom). Any larger shock would lead to a net gain of the
Government when overriding. The probability that such a large supply shock occurs
is given by α and known to the agents when forming their inflation expectations. With
probability 1−α the supply shock is not large enough to cross the threshold for overriding.
This can be written as
LG (ycom, picom, dcom)− LG (yG, piG, dG){ > CM + CF , |ε| > |ε| with prob α≤ CM + CF , |ε| ≤ |ε| with prob 1− α .
To put it differently, the Government would determine the inflation rate via the interest
rate and the deficit with probability α. With probability 1 − α, the committees decide
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about the appropriate level of their respective instruments and ultimately determine the
inflation rate. Private agents will take this institutional mechanism (captured in our
model by the value of the accountability parameter α) into account, understanding that
the level of macroeconomic variables such as inflation and output can be determined ex
post either by the MPC and the FPC or by the Government, and will form inflation
expectations accordingly. Inflation expectations are, consequently, a weighted average of
the inflation rate resulting in circumstances where the Government ultimately decides
(weighted with probability α) and the inflation rate in cases where the committees con-
duct monetary and fiscal policy (weighted with probability 1 − α). The probability of
overriding and the formation of inflation expectations are exogenously given and cannot
be influenced by policymakers.9
The order of events is assumed to be as follows. The form of accountability, in our
model the possibility of overriding, is determined by law or by the Government and goal
and/or instrument independence is granted to the MPC and the FPC. If there is goal
independence, each institution chooses its target, the inflation rate and the budget deficit,
respectively.10 Then, the private sector forms rational expectations about the inflation
rate assuming a linear rule for the interest rate and the budget deficit. The supply and
demand shocks are realized and observed by the policymakers. The MPC and the FPC
set the interest rate and the budget deficit, respectively, resulting from their optimization.
The Government checks whether any overriding, as part of the accountability mechanism,
has to take place. Inflation, output and the budget deficit are realized.
3 Key Results
The results from solving our model we characterize in the present section concern inflation
expectations and the actual levels of inflation, output and the budget deficit depending
on target values and shocks.11 We consider different policy regimes according to the
degree of independence and accountability of the committees (see Table 1 for a listing of
the possibilities).
[ Table 1 about here ]
To optimally set the instrument levels, i.e., the interest rate and the budget deficit, the
loss function of the respective policymaker is minimized with respect to the instrument
at hand. The Government can use the interest rate and the deficit jointly whereas the
MPC determines the interest rate taking the deficit as given and the FPC minimizes
its loss via the deficit taking the interest rate as given. It is assumed that any of the
expert committees, when independent, and the Government optimize simultaneously and
9Future extensions to less restrictive environments are, of course, contemplated on this aspect.
10We do not model the choice of an optimal target level.
11The interest-rate rules, as the interest rate is not itself a target variable but only an instrument in
our set-up, are not presented here. They are available upon request.
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ex post, i.e., under perfect information.12 Moreover, agents form inflation expectations by
assuming that the instrument rules are linear13 in the different target values of the relevant
macroeconomic variables, that is, inflation, output and the deficit, and the exogenous
shocks.
The precise solutions by policy regime and respective variable are provided in Ap-
pendix A. The results show, overall, that the different equilibrium values have a similar
structure depending on (a ”weighted average” of) target values, gaps between the corre-
sponding inflation and output targets of the different decision-makers, the normal output
level and the exogenous shocks. The above key terms are ”weighted” by expressions
that depend on the parameters of the economy and the preference structure, γ, of the
policymakers. These preference ”weights” play an important role, as they characterize
the different possibilities for combining the preferences of the Government, the MPC and
the FPC according to the degree of independence (0 ≤ θM ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ θF ≤ 1) and
accountability (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) of the committees. For weighting the preferences of the
Government and the FPC regarding achievement of the deficit target and the output
target, the degree of fiscal independence (θF ) matters. For weighting the preferences of
the Government and the MPC with regard to the targets on inflation and output, the
degree of monetary independence (θM) matters.
3.1 Delegation of Economic Policy without Accountability
Without accountability (α = 0), the MPC and the FPC can minimize their respective
loss, equations (4) and (6), given the strategy of the other committee. Therefore, they
have to take into account the preferences of the Government to an extent that depends
only on the degree of independence.
In the solution to the general case of the optimization of the MPC’s and the FPC’s
loss functions with partial degree of independence, Regime A (Partial Independence
without Accountability), inflation and inflation expectations differ only because of the
supply shock. The demand shock is completely offset by monetary policy. Because the
committees and the Government support different target values of inflation, output and
the deficit, and monetary and fiscal policy are not necessarily completely independent,
Government preferences matter and the gaps between the targets influence the different
variables.
There are four interesting limiting cases that arise in a set-up without accountability.
These are a completely (in)dependent monetary and fiscal policy as well as a completely
independent monetary (fiscal) and completely dependent fiscal (monetary) policy.
If monetary and fiscal policy are completely dependent, θM = 1 and θF = 1, it is as if
the Government determines economic policy according to its own liking. The committees
12The more complicated cases of sequential optimization and/or imperfect information are left for
future research.
13All policy feedback rules are restricted to be linear here. Nonlinear reaction functions are a next
natural extension.
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only implement the instrument values that the Government decides. This Regime A1
(Government Optimization without Accountability) is therefore, in essence, Government
optimization. The results show that, whereas the deficit is on target, the inflation rate and
inflation expectations end up above target because of the inflationary bias that originates
in targeting output above its natural level, i.e., in the Government’s re-election concern.
Actual inflation and inflation expectations differ because of the supply shock that is not
completely offset by policymakers. This yields an output level that deviates from its
natural level; upwards if a positive supply shock has materialized, and downwards in the
case of a negative supply shock.
The second limiting case is that of completely independent monetary and fiscal poli-
cies, θM = 0 and θF = 0. In this Regime A2 (Independent and Unaccountable Commit-
tees), both committees are independent from the Government to determine the respec-
tive instrument level and are not accountable, in the sense that their decisions cannot
be changed. In this case, the deficit reacts to the supply shock and differs from target
value. Inflation expectations are on target and differ from inflation because of a not fully
dampened supply shock. This leads also to an output level that deviates from the normal
one in the direction of the cost-push shock.
In Regime A3 (Independent and Unaccountable MPC with Completely Dependent
FPC), monetary policy is assumed to be completely independent and unaccountable,
whereas the FPC is completely dependent, θM = 0 and θF = 1. Because fiscal policy
is conducted with regard to Government preferences and targets, the deficit explicitly
depends on the gaps between the output and inflation targets, where the basic level of
the deficit is given by the Government target. Inflation expectations are anchored at
target value and differ from the inflation rate because of the supply shock. This leads
to an output level different from the normal level, depending on the sign and size of the
supply shock.
If monetary policy is completely dependent on the Government but fiscal policy is
completely independent, θM = 1 and θF = 0, we have Regime A4 (Independent and
Unaccountable FPC with Completely Dependent MPC). Again, there is the influence
of the difference between targets and the not completely offset supply shock, leading to
deviations of output from target via the gap between inflation and inflation expectations.
3.2 Delegation of Economic Policy with Accountability
With accountability modeled explicitly (0 < α ≤ 1), there are two possible deficit levels,
interest rates, inflation rates and output levels depending on whether overriding takes
place or not. If no overriding occurs, the monetary and fiscal policy committees (hence,
superscript com in the relevant subsections of Appendix A) are left to determine simul-
taneously the inflation rate and the output level. If overriding occurs, the Government
(superscript G) steps in and ultimately determines instead the level of the macroeconomic
variables. There is only one level of inflation expectations, however, giving each of the
two possibilities for ex post inflation a probability of α, respectively 1 − α. In contrast
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to the preceding subsection, Government preferences matter in every regime because the
committees can now be overridden even in cases of complete independence, a possibility
that is taken account of in the formation of inflation expectations.
The general solution in equilibrium for Regime B (Partial Independence with Ac-
countability) yields the deficit, inflation expectations, inflation and output if the Gov-
ernment steps in and decides about the instruments or if the MPC and the FPC are not
overridden and conduct policy according to their preferences. In both cases, inflation ex-
pectations are the same because agents do not know ex ante the size of the supply shock
that causes the Government to override MPC’s and FPC’s decisions ex post. Therefore,
agents take both possibilities into account when forming inflation expectations. However,
the policymakers optimize ex post, simultaneously and under perfect information, know-
ing the size of the supply shock, so inflation, output and the deficit are decided among
the authorities in charge.
Again, we consider the same four special cases. If both committees are completely
dependent, θM = 1 and θF = 1, we have Regime B1 (Government Optimization with
Accountability). The results are the same as if the Government would minimize the loss
from start, i.e., as in Regime A1. With complete dependence, the committees only im-
plement the instruments that are determined according to the Government’s preferences
and targets.
Regime B2 (Independent but Accountable Committees) is characterized by com-
pletely independent but accountable committees, θM = 0, θF = 0, 0 < α ≤ 1. The struc-
ture of the results is the same as if with partially independent committees. However, the
influence of the Government is muted because it affects the results only according to the
inflation expectations of private agents, and not from the very beginning via the objective
functions of the committees as it would be the case with incomplete independence. In
this regime, the difference between the variables determined when the Government or the
committees ultimately decide should be larger than under incomplete independence.
If there is an independent but accountable MPC only and fiscal policy is completely
dependent on the Government, θM = 0, 0 < α ≤ 1 and θF = 1, we are in Regime B3
(Independent but Accountable MPC with Completely Dependent FPC). The deficit, the
inflation rate, inflation expectations and output are the same as in Regime B2. What
matters is the dependence of monetary policy whereas the (in)dependence of fiscal policy
does not play a role for the determination of inflation, inflation expectations and output.
Only the deficit will be determined by the preferences of the FPC if the committees are
left to decide.
An independent but accountable FPC only, θF = 0, 0 < α ≤ 1 and θM = 1, Regime
B4 (Independent but Accountable FPC with Completely Dependent MPC), yields the
same results as Regime A4 if the FPC is left to decide. If the Government overrides
instead, it will implement dG = d∗,G, but inflation, inflation expectations and output
would be the same as if the committees would determine the instrument levels. The
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particular institutional arrangement being A4 or B4 is, thus, not crucial for the level of
the macroeconomic variables except for the deficit.
3.3 Ranking of Regimes by Expected Inflation Outcomes
We now propose an interpretation of our key results along a few dimensions of ranking the
equilibrium outcomes of our model. We discuss alternative rankings based on a single
criterion, and focus on different criteria in turn, to highlight each of the three target
variables. To them, we add a fourth criterion, inflation expectations, with which we start
here the rankings. The reason is that anchoring private-sector expectations, although not
a target in the explicit loss functions policymakers optimize upon, is perhaps the most
important task of monetary and fiscal policy. With regard to the ranking of regimes
according to inflation expectations, we come to the following conclusions.
Proposition 1 An institution-design regime that implements optimal macroeconomic
policies with the lowest anchor for inflation expectations is one with a fully indepen-
dent non-elected MPC whose decisions are explicitly guaranteed not to be overridden by,
and in the latter sense unaccountable to, elected politicians.
Corollary 1.1 Provided that monetary policy is delegated to a fully independent and
unaccountable MPC, delegation or not of fiscal policy to a similarly unaccountable and
independent FPC does not matter for inflation expectations.
Corollary 1.2 All considered mechanisms for policymaking without accountability mod-
eled as an override clause (Regimes A) dominate the corresponding mechanisms with
accountability (Regimes B) along the dimension of anchoring inflation expectations.
Proof of Proposition 1 and the related corollaries 1.1 and 1.2
A. Without Accountability We start by selecting the special case(s) with the lowest
inflation expectations outcome among the identified four regimes without accountability
in our framework. We show below that Regimes A2 and A3 perform best along this
particular dimension of ranking we here consider first. If the appointed MPC of experts
is completely independent of any interference of the elected Government, in terms of being
both allowed to pursue its own targets and spared from the possibility to be overridden,
it will efficiently anchor down inflation expectations precisely at its target:
pieA2,A3 = pi
∗ < pi∗,G.
This is true no matter whether the FPC is also fully independent and unaccountable.
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We next compare with the above supposed minimum the expectations effect in the case
of fully dependent monetary policy, with fiscal policy either fully dependent or delegated
to an independent and unaccountable expert committee, i.e., Regimes A1 and A4.
pieA1,A4 = pi
∗,G + c
γGy
γGpi
(
y∗,G − yN) .
Insofar we allow for any re-election concern of the Government, y∗,G−yN > 0, in line with
the tradition of the literature on time-inconsistency, A1 and, identically, A4, produces a
substantial inflationary bias, which is a standard result. The expected inflation is higher,
i.e., the inflationary bias is stronger, the higher is the Government’s weight on output
relative to that on inflation, γGy /γ
G
pi > 1, and the stronger is the reaction of aggregate
supply to surprise inflation, captured by c > 0. In fact, an elastic AS response to forecast
errors in expectations, i.e., a steeper Phillips curve slope, c > 1, magnifies the effect of
any given measure, y∗,G − yN > 0, of the re-election concern on inflation expectations,
while an inelastic AS response, i.e., a flatter Phillips curve slope, dampens it.14 Only if
the Government is not pursuing an overambitious output target, y∗,G− yN = 0, inflation
would be pi∗ = pi∗,G = pie, as in Regimes A2 and A3.
The special case of equally-split responsibility of policy formulation and implementa-
tion, θM = 1/2, then results in an intermediate magnitude of expected inflation:
pie =
γGpi
γMpi + γ
G
pi
pi∗ +
γMpi
γMpi + γ
G
pi
pi∗,G + c
γGy
γMpi + γ
G
pi
(
y∗,G − yN) .
Insofar the re-election concern exists, we still have an inflationary bias relative to the
cases of fully independent MPC (A2 and A3). Yet now the expected inflation outcome is
lower than the one under fully dependent monetary policy (A1 and A4), because of two
reasons. First, the multiplier to the output target gap is now smaller relative to the latter
two regimes, since cγGy /
(
γMpi + γ
G
pi
)
< cγGy /γ
G
pi , that is, because the preference weight
of the equally-responsible monetary policymaker, γMpi , now plays a role in reducing the
response of private-sector expectations to the re-election concern. Second, only a fraction,
0 < γMpi /
(
γMpi + γ
G
pi
)
< 1, of the overambitious Government’s target for inflation, pi∗,G,
now forms the expected level of inflation, together with a smaller (assuming 0 < γGpi <
γMpi < 1, as we do) fraction, 0 < γ
G
pi /
(
γMpi + γ
G
pi
)
< 1, of the MPC’s lower inflation target,
pi∗, consistent with attaining normal output level on average.
Finally, taking up the general case without accountability, Regime A,
pieA =
(
1− θM)
Π
γMpi pi
∗ +
θM
Π
[
γGpi pi
∗,G + cγGy
(
y∗,G − yN)] ,
14There is no theoretical or empirical reason to restrict our parameter c to a particular positive-valued
range (Woodford 2003, p. 245). Earlier aggregative models have AS or Phillips curve relations where
the analogous parameter to c here is not restricted more than just being a positive number (Sargent and
Wallace 1975, p. 242).
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it naturally splits into two regions. If we set θM = 1/2 in the general case above, so that
Π = 1/[2
(
γGpi + γ
M
pi
)
] and, thus, becomes the average preference weight on inflation for the
Government and the monetary committee, the above expression collapses exactly into the
special case of equal responsibilities. Then (i) if 0 < θM < 1/2 so that the MPC opinion
matters more than that of the Government in deciding on targets and preferences with
respect to inflation (and output), pi∗,G and y∗,G−yN will be weighted less and pi∗ more so
that the re-election concern will be less important in expectation formation. Therefore,
general case A (i) will be ranked between A2=A3 and the special case of θM = 1/2 in
terms of our unique, expected inflation criterion of ranking institutional regimes here. By
contrast, and following analogous reasoning, general case A (ii), where 1/2 < θM < 1,
will come in this ranking between the special case of θM = 1/2 and A1=A4. The ranking
we just derived is reflected in the top (Regimes A) half of the middle column of Table 2
further down.
B. With Accountability It is interesting first to note that consideration of account-
ability modeled as the explicit inclusion of an override clause in the incentive contracts
written between the Government and the expert committees does not matter in terms
of private-sector inflation expectations for the institution-design regimes where monetary
policy is dependent: the expectation outcomes of Regimes B1 and B4 are exactly the
same as the parallel outcomes of Regimes A1 and A4.
We thus turn to the two cases where the MPC is independent but now accountable,
Regimes B2 and B3, in the sense of facing a possibility that its optimal decisions are
overridden by the Government. Logically, this adds a constraint in the optimization of
the MPC and influences it away from its priority on inflation expectations and more
into stabilization considerations concerning actual inflation and output. This results in
expectations formation that is less favorable than our best regimes on this account, A2
and A3:
pieB2,B3 =
αγGpi (γMpi +c2γMy )
αc2γGpi γ
M
y +γ
G
pi γ
M
pi +(1−α)c2γGy γMpi pi
∗,G +
(1−α)γMpi (γGpi+c2γGy )
αc2γGpi γ
M
y +γ
G
pi γ
M
pi +(1−α)c2γGy γMpi pi
∗
+
c(γGpi γMy (1−α)+2γMy (1−α)c2γGy +γGy (1−α)γMpi −c2γGy γMy −γGy γMpi )
αc2γGpi γ
M
y +γ
G
pi γ
M
pi +(1−α)c2γGy γMpi y
N
+
αcγGy (γMpi +c2γMy )
αc2γGpi γ
M
y +γ
G
pi γ
M
pi +(1−α)c2γGy γMpi y
∗,G.
Take first “fair odds” of being overridden, i.e., α = 1/2. The general case of Regimes
B2=B3 then translates into the following special case:
pie
B2,B3,α= 1
2
=
( 12 c2γGpi γMy +
1
2
γGpi γ
M
pi )
( 12 c2γGpi γMy +
1
2
γGpi γ
M
pi )+ 12γGpi γMpi +c2γGy γMpi
pi∗,G + (
1
2
γGpi γ
M
pi +
1
2
c2γGy γ
M
pi )
1
2
c2γGpi γ
M
y +
1
2
γGpi γ
M
pi +( 12γGpi γMpi +
1
2
c2γGy γ
M
pi )
pi∗
+
1
2
c(γGpi γMy −γGy γMpi )
1
2
c2(γGpi γMy +γGy γMpi )+γGpi γMpi
yN +
1
2
c3γMy γ
G
y +( 12 cγGy γMpi )
1
2
c2γGpi γ
M
y +γ
G
pi γ
M
pi +c( 12 cγGy γMpi )
y∗,G.
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These coefficients have a common denominator and the following ranges of magnitude,
respectively:
0 < Coeff. of pi∗,G
B2,B3,α= 1
2
< 1; 0 < Coeff. of pi∗
B2,B3,α= 1
2
< 1;
Coeff. of yN
B2,B3,α= 1
2
< 0 since γGpi γ
M
y < γ
G
y γ
M
pi ; Coeff. of y
∗,G
B2,B3,α= 1
2
> 0.
Comparing the coefficients above with the simple expression for the corresponding regimes
without accountability, pieA2,A3 = pi
∗, we can conclude that Regime A2=A3 dominates
Regime B2=B3 for α = 1/2 in terms of anchoring inflation expectations to a lower level.
First, the coefficients on pi∗ and pi∗,G above are both between 0 and 1, implying some sort
of weighting of the inflation targets of the MPC and the Government, with pi∗ < pi∗,G,
but with the coefficient on pi∗,G definitely smaller than that on pi∗, since γGpi γ
M
y < γ
G
y γ
M
pi :
Coeff. of pi∗,G
B2,B3,α= 1
2
< Coeff. of pi∗
B2,B3,α= 1
2
.
Second, insofar y∗,G > yN and because the positive coefficient on the Government’s output
target dominates in absolute value the negative coefficient on the MPC’s target of normal
output, since γGy γ
M
pi + c
2γMy γ
G
y > γ
G
y γ
M
pi − γGpi γMy > 0,∣∣∣Coeff. of y∗,G
B2,B3,α= 1
2
∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣Coeff. of yNB2,B3,α= 1
2
∣∣∣ ,
because another positive constant is added on top of the weighted inflation targets just
discussed determining pieB2,B3,α=1/2.
For the more general case of 0 < α < 1/2 (small(er) probability of overriding),
the weight on the MPC’s inflation target would be higher than in the special case of
α = 1/2 relative to that of the Government’s inflation target; and the weight on the
Government’s overambitious output target relative to normal output would be lower.
Hence, on both counts, inflation expectations would be even lower than under α = 1/2.
Conversely, for the more general case of 1/2 < α < 1 (high(er) probability of overriding),
the weight on the MPC’s inflation target would be lower than in the special case of
α = 1/2 relative to that of the Government’s inflation target; and the weight on the
Government’s overambitious output target relative to normal output would be higher.
Hence, on both counts, inflation expectations would be higher than under α = 1/2.
Thus, being a ”weighted average” of Government’s and MPC’s targets, not just for
α = 1/2 but also for any general probability of overriding 0 < α < 1 as we showed
above, expected inflation is higher with accountability in B2 and B3 than it is in the
parallel cases with independent and unaccountable MPC in A2 and A3. Regime A2=A3
dominates Regime B2=B3 in terms of anchoring private-sector expectations. For the
same reason and following analogous logic, Regime A dominates Regime B in terms of
expectation formation. This completes our proof of Proposition 1 and corollaries 1.1 and
1.2 ¥.
16
The corresponding ranking of the above regimes along the inflation expectations di-
mension is summarized in the middle column of Table 2.
3.4 Ranking of Regimes by Actual Inflation Outcomes
Realized inflation differs from the rationally forecasted one only by a term containing the
ex-post supply shock, ε – as the demand shock, ², is accounted for by policy in every
materialized state of nature – multiplied by some combination of parameters. Hence, all
expressions that we analyzed in the preceding subsection are usable again with a slight
modification. We present next the deviations pi − pie across regimes and then rank the
latter according to the smallest (in absolute value) deviation of actual from expected
inflation.
Proposition 2 An institution-design regime that implements optimal macroeconomic
policies with the lowest deviation of actual inflation from target is, again, one with a
fully independent and unaccountable MPC of experts.
Corollary 2.1 Provided that monetary policy is delegated to a fully independent and
unaccountable MPC, delegation or not of fiscal policy to a similarly unaccountable and
independent FPC does not matter for stabilizing ex post deviations of actual inflation
from target, in an analogous way to the ex ante formation of inflation expectations.
Corollary 2.2 All considered mechanisms for policymaking without accountability mod-
eled as an override clause (Regimes A) also dominate the corresponding institutional
contracts with accountability (Regimes B) in terms of resulting in lower deviation of
actual inflation from target.
Proof of Proposition 2 and the related corollaries 2.1 and 2.2
A. Without Accountability Our extremes are, again, completely independent and
unaccountable expert committees (Regime A2) versus a Government that optimizes alone
(Regime A1). In Regime A2 (and A3), the deviation in question, pi − pie, is:
(pi − pie)A2,A3 =
(
cγMy
)
γMpi + c
(
cγMy
)ε, so that 0 < Coeff. of εA2,A3 < 1,
and the effect of the materialized aggregate supply disturbance, ε, on actual inflation and
on the forecast error is thus dampened, the more so the higher is the MPC’s preference
weight on inflation, γMpi , and the more sensitive is aggregate supply to surprise inflation,
i.e., the larger c.
At the other extreme, Regime A1 (and A4), the deviation pi − pie is instead:
(pi − pie)A1,A4 =
(
cγGy
)
γGpi + c
(
cγGy
)ε, so that, again, 0 < Coeff. of εA1,A4 < 1,
17
and the impact of the cost-push shock on actual inflation and on its deviation from
expectations is dampened. However, insofar γGpi < γ
M
pi and γ
G
y > γ
M
y , the dampening
effect is stronger on both counts in Regime A2 relative to Regime A1. Note that, again,
Regime A2 is equivalent to Regime A3, and Regime A1 to A4 if the criterion for ranking
is, like in the present subsection, the deviation of actual from expected inflation.
B. With Accountability Now the ranking is less evident, but we can show the fol-
lowing relations. We first compare Regimes B2G and B2com. We form the difference
piGB2 − picomB2 =
(
piGB2 − pieB2
)− (picomB2 − pieB2). There are three pairs of terms in the respec-
tive expressions for piGB2 and pi
com
B2 that are different:
cγGy
κ
in piGB2 <
cΩ
Π+ c2Ω
in picomB2 ;
(1− α) c2γGy in the 2nd term of piGB2 < κ− αc2γGy in the 2nd term of picomB2 ;
Π + c2θMγGy in the 4th term of pi
G
B2 > θ
Mκ in the 4th term of picomB2 .
The first pair of terms multiply the supply shock, ε; the second pair multiply the inflation
target gap, pi∗−pi∗,G < 0; and the third pair of terms multiply the output gap, y∗,G−yN >
0: on both counts, a smaller multiple to a negative term and a greater multiple to
a positive term in the respective (G versus com) actual inflation expressions for any
realization of ε (with the remaining terms in them being the same: compare Regime B2
with override versus committee decision in Appendix A):
piGB2 > pi
com
B2 ⇔
(
piGB2 − pie
)
> (picomB2 − pie) ,
i.e., B2com results in smaller deviations of actual inflation from target relative to B2G.
We next argue that A2, in turn, results in even smaller deviations of actual inflation
from target relative to B2com, because: (i) picomB2 is some weighted average of pi
∗ and pi∗,G;
(2) the supply shock multiplier in picomB2 is bigger than that in piA2; and (iii) there are,
furthermore, two positive terms added in picomB2 which are absent in piA2.
So, A2<B2com<B2G or A2<B2, i.e., Regime A2 (without accountability) leads to a
smaller deviation of actual inflation from target relative to the corresponding Regime B2
(with accountability).
Similarly to the logic we exposed above, one can then also show that the remaining
Regimes B, with accountability, are dominated by the respective Regimes A, without
accountability, along the dimension of producing the lowest deviation of actual inflation
from target. Hence, the best regime in terms of containing inflation following a cost-push
shock is to design the MPC fully independent and unaccountable. This completes our
proof of Proposition 2 and corollaries 2.1 and 2.2 ¥.
The ranking according to our second criterion, in fact, a parallel image of the ranking
along the criterion of anchoring inflation expectations, is summarized in the final column
of Table 2. On account of both these criteria, therefore, (i) anchoring inflation expecta-
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tions (ex ante) and (ii) containing the effects of cost-push shocks on actual inflation (ex
post), we have reached an unambiguous conclusion in terms of (a) the best regime as well
as (b) the ordering of the alternative policy frameworks we considered here.15
[ Table 2 about here ]
3.5 Ranking of Regimes by Actual Output Outcomes
Besides inflation and inflation expectations, the output level is another key macroeco-
nomic variable in our model: it is not an instrument itself, but is the only magnitude that
plays an important role in all of the three objective functions.
A. Without Accountability The output levels that arise in the different policy
regimes without accountability are all based on the normal output level and show different
deviations from this benchmark. The deviations arise in regimes without accountability
solely because of the supply shock. The impact of the demand shock is completely com-
pensated by the policymakers. The influence of the supply shock on output depends on
the preferences of the policymakers. In case of a positive (negative) supply shock, output
is higher (lower) than normal. The size of the influence can be ordered as follows:
Proposition 3 Without accountability, the output level in Regime A1 is equal to the
level in Regime A4 and the output level in Regime A2 is equal to the level in Regime A3.
With γMpi /γ
M
y > 1 > γ
G
pi /γ
G
y and γ
M
pi > γ
G
pi , which is the assumed realistic situation in the
model, the output level A1 and A4 is closer to normal output than the output level A2
and A3. In the general case A, the output level is intermediate between the polar regimes.
Proof of Proposition 3 To establish this result, we concentrate on the coefficient of
the supply shock term in the output equations because the shock is the only source that
drives output away from normal in all regimes:
Coeff. of εA2,A3 > Coeff. of εA > Coeff. of εA1,A4,
γMpi
γMpi + c
2γMy
>
Π
Π+ c2Ω
>
γGpi
γGpi + c
2γGy
.
The result is opposite to the one for expected inflation. For output, the deviation from
normal level is highest if monetary policy is independent. If the Government dominates
policymaking, output stabilization is according to its preferences. Because the MPC
gives a higher priority to bringing inflation back to target rather than output compared
15The unambiguous ranking of actual inflation outcomes across regimes arises because deviations
from expected inflation are considered that results only due to the supply shock. If absolute levels
of inflation rates are compared instead, a similar ambiguity as in the case of output levels arises and
target differences play a role in addition to the supply shock as discussed next. A comparison of the
inflation rate determined by the Government with the one determined by the committees in Regime B
with accountability shows that there is a realization of the supply shock where the inflation rates are
equal. The shock is of the same size as the one that equates the output levels, yG and ycom in Regime
B (see equation (10)).
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to the Government, it is not surprising that a supply shock has a larger impact on the
output level if the MPC is independent and can stabilize according to its own preferences
only. In the general case of Regime A, shock stabilization is a ”weighted average” of the
preferences of the Government and the MPC, where the weight is according to the degree
of independence of the MPC. In this case, an intermediate level of shock stabilization
arises. This completes our proof of Proposition 3 ¥.
B. With Accountability When the MPC and the FPC can be made accountable in
the sense implied by our model, and, in case of large supply shocks, are overridden by
the Government, in each regime two different output levels can arise. The Government
determines both the interest rate and the deficit, and this results in a particular output
level, with probability α. With probability 1−α, the MPC and the FPC each determine
their instrument and “tie” the output level down. As soon as the MPC is not completely
independent, the output level is not only influenced by normal output and the supply
shock but also by the difference between the Government’s inflation target and the MPC’s
target as well as by the gap between the output target of the Government and normal
output being the target of the MPC and the FPC. This result comes from the uncertainty
of the private sector which institution would be the policymaker in charge when forming
inflation expectations.
Unlike in the formation of inflation expectations, the probability of overriding does
not play a role in shock stabilization since this task is done after the authority in charge
of economic policy is determined ex post. When the private sector forms expectations,
shock stabilization does not matter because of an expected shock value of zero; therefore,
which authority stabilizes the shock does not matter either.
Moreover, only the degree of dependence of the MPC matters for the output level:
the case of a completely independent MPC leads to the same output level regardless
whether the FPC is completely independent or completely dependent (Regimes B2 and
B3). Again, normal output is the starting point for actual output. However, there is an
additional influence of the normal output level on actual output that increases its impact
above unity. The size of the effect depends on the degree of independence of the MPC,
the probability of overriding, and the preferences of the Government and the MPC with
regard to inflation and the output gap.
Proposition 4 If the Government ultimately determines the instruments in the regimes
with accountability, the output level in Regime B1 equals that of Regime B4 and the output
level in Regime B2 equals that of B3. The output level in B1 and B4 is lower and closer
to the normal level compared to the output levels in all other regimes. The output level
in B2 is higher than in B. If the committees are left to decide instead, the net effect is
ambiguous and ranking is not possible.
Proof of Proposition 4 If the MPC is completely dependent, shock stabilization is
determined by the Government only and, therefore, only Government preferences deter-
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mine the output level (Regimes B1 and B4). Output only deviates from normal level
because of the supply shock. However, if monetary policy is not completely dependent
on Government preferences, the Government takes into account the MPC preferences via
inflation expectations. In this case, output increases because of the overambitious target
levels of the Government, y∗,G > yN and pi∗,G > pi∗. The impact of the normal output
level on output besides the difference to the Government target is positive regardless of
the regime with accountability. The highest output level is reached if the Government
overrides the completely independent MPC (Regimes B2 and B3). Here, agents expect
especially low inflation and, therefore, the Government can raise output exceptionally
high with lower reaction of the inflation rate than with only partial independence.
If the committees are left to determine the instrument level under accountability,
the results have the same structure as in the regimes where the Government steps in.
However, the effects of the gap between the inflation targets of the Government and the
committees and the gap between the output target of the Government and normal output
have the opposite sign. The committees determine the instrument level in a way that these
gaps now have a negative influence on the output level. The respective influences are of
the same magnitude as when the Government overrides the committees but weighted with
the probability that the Government does not step in, 1−α, instead of α. The influence of
the normal output level besides that of the difference to the Government target is of the
same size and magnitude as in the case where the Government finally decides. Moreover,
the influence of the supply shock is higher if the committees are not overridden because
they have a lower preference for output stabilization. If the committees decide, output
would be lower as a rule compared to Government decisions. However, there is a range
for positive supply shocks where ycom > yG and for
ε =
γMpi κ (Π + c
2Ω)
Λcω
[
γGpi
(
pi∗,G − pi∗)+ cγGy (y∗,G − yN)] (10)
in the general case. Figure 1 shows the basic mechanism that leads to this result and
that also applies to all other comparisons of output outcomes when the committees are
involved.
The starting point is the normal output level multiplied with a term that is higher
than one. Because the weighting of normal output is the same regardless whether the
Government or the committees decide, we observe deviation from that level. First, a
deviation occurs because of the impact of the supply shock that is partly accommodated
by the policymaker in charge. Because the Government has higher preferences for output
on target, the deviation from normal output is lower for the Government policies. This
leads to a higher Government output level in case of a negative and a lower level in case
of a positive supply shock compared to the respective committee levels. Second, the
target differences also lead to a deviation from normal output but in an unambiguous
way; output with the Government in charge is always higher. However, there is a range
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--
-ff ε > 0ε < 0
[
1 +
(1−α)(1−θM)bcγMy κ
Λ
]
yN
yGycom yG ycom
yGycom
XXXXXXXXXz
»»»»»»»»»9
(1−α)(1−θM)cγMpi
Λ
[
γGpi
(
pi∗,G − pi∗)
+cγGy
(
y∗,G − yN)]
α(1−θM)cγMpi
Λ
[
γGpi
(
pi∗ − pi∗,G)
+cγGy
(
yN − y∗,G)]
Figure 1: The influences on the output level when the Government decides and when the
committees decide in the general case with accountability.
where the Government level of output is lower than the committee level because of the
stronger stabilization. This completes our proof of Proposition 4 ¥.
Corollary 4.1 Comparing the policy regimes with and without accountability, Regime
A1 and A4 produce the same output level as Regime B1 and B4. For all other regimes,
the relationship between the output levels is ambiguous.
Proof of Corollary 4.1 If monetary policy is completely dependent, only Government
preferences determine output stabilization and output deviates from the normal level
only because of supply shocks. In addition, no target deviations occur, so that without
shocks output always equals its normal level. In this case, there is no difference between
the regimes with and without accountability (Regimes 1 and 4). This also confirms
the presumption that it is not reasonable to hold a completely dependent authority
accountable. Because of the above-established equality between Regimes A1, B1, A4
and B4, the results from the previous proposition directly carry over to the comparison
between the output outcome of the regimes with and without accountability.
For output stabilization across responsibilities and accountability regimes, the follow-
ing results can be established:
Coeff. of εA1,A4,B1,B4 = Coeff. of ε
G
B2,B3 < Coeff. of εA2,A3 = Coeff. of ε
com
B2,B3,
γGpi
γGpi + c
2γGy
<
γMpi
γMpi + c
2γMy
.
The highest degree of output stabilization is achieved if the Government is in charge of
monetary policy. This can be the case without accountability when the committees are
completely dependent (Regimes A1(=B1)=A4(=B4)), and with accountability when the
Government overrides (Regimes B2, B3). In each case, shock stabilization occurs with
regard to Government preferences only. For shock stabilization, accountability does not
matter because the policymakers decide about stabilization if they have the power to do
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so and private agents do not expect shocks on average. Therefore, only own preferences
play any role.
Because target differences only occur in regimes with accountability, output is higher
(lower) compared to regimes without accountability if the Government (the committees)
is (are) in charge and if monetary policy is not completely dependent. Because target
differences between the Government and the committees are negative in cases where the
committees decide, the net effect is not clear since such differences point in the opposite
direction compared to the positive effect of the normal output level. If the Government is
in charge, the net effect is unambiguously positive, when putting aside the supply shock.
This completes our proof of Corollary 4.1 ¥.
A summary of our results on the ranking of the considered policy regimes according
to actual output is provided in Table 3.
[ Table 3 about here ]
3.6 Ranking of Regimes by Actual Deficit Outcomes
In opposition to the interest rate, the budget deficit has a twofold role to play in our
model. First, it is an instrument to stimulate demand. Second, it is a target in the loss
functions of the Government and the FPC.
Proposition 5 In all regimes where the Government can decide on monetary and fiscal
policy jointly, the budget deficit will equal the Government target.
Proof of Proposition 5 The Government will establish the deficit on target if the
monetary and fiscal authorities are completely dependent and implement policy according
to the preferences of the Government as well as if it overrides committee decisions in the
regimes with accountability. If both instruments are optimized jointly, then the deficit
is not needed to influence inflation and output: the interest rate is sufficient as policy
instrument. To get this result, a dependent fiscal policy is not enough; monetary policy
has to be dependent too.
The starting point in analyzing the deficit is a deficit target value independent of
whether accountability is intended or not. In cases where fiscal policy is dependent, the
target equals that of the Government. With independent fiscal policy, the target of the
FPC prevails. With intermediate values of FPC independence, a weighted average of the
targets can be observed depending on the degree of fiscal policy autonomy.
A. Without Accountability If no accountability of the committees is intended, the
deficit reacts not only to the target level but decreases (increases) with positive (negative)
supply shocks. Ranking the regimes without accountability according to the reaction to
supply shocks, Regime A1 does not show any influence of supply shocks. In Regime A2,
the influence of the supply shock is larger than in Regime A4. A ranking of the other
regimes according to the shock is not possible. The reaction of the deficit to supply
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shocks in regimes with accountability is the same as in the respective A regimes if the
committees are left to decide. If the Government overrides, there is no influence of the
shock. The relation between the influence of the supply shock on the deficit level in
Regimes A2 and A3 looks as follows:
γMpi
γMy
(
γFd
γFy
− γ
G
d
γGy
)
R γ
G
pi γ
F
d
γGy γ
F
y
;
and the corresponding relation in Regimes A3 and A4 is given by:
γGpi
γGd
γMpi
γMy
γMpi
γMpi + c
2γMy
R
γGy
γGd
γMpi
γMpi + c
2γMy
− γ
F
y
γFd
γGpi
γGpi + c
2γGy
.
In addition to supply shocks, the deficit reacts to the difference between the inflation and
output targets of the committees and the Government if monetary policy is completely
independent but fiscal policy is not (Regime A3) and if both committees are partially
independent (Regimes A). In these cases, the Government tries to offset some influence
of the independent determination of the interest rate. If monetary policy is completely
dependent but fiscal policy independent, such effects do not occur.
B. With Accountability In regimes with accountability, target differences play a role
if the committees are not overridden and are partially independent (Regimes B) or where
monetary policy is completely independent (Regimes B2 and B3). With independent
monetary policy, the deficit reacts in a stronger way to the target differences if fiscal
policy is dependent on Government preferences. The deficit is then used as an instrument
to achieve the overambitious output target of the Government.
If the Government decides alone, the deficit is always on target and not needed for
stabilization purposes or aiming at target levels for inflation and output. A ranking of
the deficit when the committees are not overridden by the Government looks as follows.
In Regime B1 with completely dependent committees, the deficit is on target. If the FPC
is made independent, it also reacts to shocks but introduces a lower target level. If the
MPC is made completely independent, there is also a reaction to the target differences
that is more aggressive (stronger) with a dependent FPC. But the reaction to shocks
cannot be compared between the two regimes with completely independent MPC. This
completes our proof of Proposition 5 ¥.
We summarize our findings on the comparison of regimes along the dimension of the
public deficit in Table 4.
[ Table 4 about here ]
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4 Concluding Remarks
This paper set as its objective to address the important issue of independence and ac-
countability of delegated monetary and fiscal policy. In a theoretical model allowing for
different degrees of autonomy of expert committees to which the government may opt to
delegate both monetary and fiscal policy as well as for subsequent interactions, we analyze
the effects of democratic accountability in the form of possible overriding of committee
decisions. As the literature on monetary policy has usually established, we also find that
delegation of decision-making to autonomous institutions of appointed experts improves
the outcomes in terms of average inflation performance over policies conducted by elected
and self-interested governments. In other words, independent monetary and fiscal author-
ities operating within clear mandates solve the problem of inflationary bias by anchoring
inflation expectations on target. However, our work clearly points out that there is more
to that aspect in evaluating the independence of policymakers once accountability is also
explicitly considered.
A fully independent non-elected MPC whose decisions are explicitly guaranteed not
to be overridden by, and in the latter context unaccountable to, elected politicians is
the institution-design regime we found to implement the lowest anchoring of inflation
expectations. Once monetary policy is delegated to such an expert committee, delega-
tion or not of fiscal policy as well to a parallel independent FPC does not matter for
inflation expectations in our set-up. Along this same dimension, all considered mecha-
nisms for policymaking without the possibility of overriding dominate the corresponding
mechanisms with accountability.
However, we derived an opposite result in terms of regime ordering when ex post
output stabilization was chosen instead as the unique criterion for selecting the socially
optimal policy. Because the government, aiming at re-election, is more concerned about
meeting the output target, the highest output stabilization arises if its preferences alone
determine stabilization: either in the case where monetary policy is completely depen-
dent, or when the government overrides MPC’s decisions. The impact of lower output
stabilization by the committees will be bounded because the government steps in if large
supply shocks occur and dampens the effects according to its higher stabilization prefer-
ences.
Overall, applying any combination of the above considerations as a multiple criterion
to rank the examined institution-design mechanisms may give priority to either anchoring
inflation expectations ex ante, and hence also stabilizing ex post inflation, or to output
stabilization, possibly constrained by attaining the target for the public-sector deficit too.
This is, certainly, a political trade-off, and any solution to it would be chosen in each
relevant real-world context with view to the preferences of society and its democratic
representatives, as well as the economic environment and the institutional framework for
policymaking. What we can conclude from our theoretical exercise is that if the priority
is to manage inflation and inflation expectations, a society should opt for independent
monetary policy which is free from the threat of its decisions being overridden. If, on
25
the other hand, a society would prefer to mitigate the fluctuations of output and em-
ployment, policymaking by expert committees should be additionally constrained either
by limits to independence, e.g., permitting instrument- but not goal-independence, as in
popular inflation targeting regimes of monetary policy, or by accountability mechanisms
such as override clauses or more sophisticated contractual arrangements with broadly
similar effects. A combination of both these restrictive institutional devices, one acting
upon the degree of independence and the other upon the degree of accountability, is also
envisageable – as well as any intermediate policy regimes between the polar cases – de-
pending on the priorities and corresponding trade-offs a democratic society is prepared
to accept and implement.
26
A Model Solution
Throughout, we will use the following abbreviations:
∆ := θFγGd +
(
1− θF ) γFd , Υ := θFγGy + (1− θF ) γFy ,
Π := θMγGpi +
(
1− θM) γMpi , Ω := θMγGy + (1− θM) γMy ,
κ := γGpi + c
2γGy , ϕ := γ
M
pi + c
2γMy , ω := γ
G
y γ
M
pi − γGpi γMy , Λ := κΠ− α
(
1− θM) c2ω.
Delegation of Economic Policy without Accountability
Regime A: General-Case Solution: Partial Independence without Account-
ability
We derive the following equilibrium outcomes for the deficit, the inflation rate, inflation
expectations and output:
d =
θF γGd d
∗,G +
(
1− θF
)
γFd d
∗
∆
+
a
(
1− θM
)
θF
∆Π
[
γGpi γ
M
pi
c
(
pi∗,G − pi∗)+ (γMpi γGy y∗,G − γGpi γMy yN)]
−
a
[(
1− θM
)
θFω +
(
1− θF
)
γFy Π
]
(Π + c2Ω)∆
ε, (A-1)
pi =
θMγGpi
Π
pi∗,G +
(
1− θM
)
γMpi
Π
pi∗ +
cθMγGy
Π
(
y∗,G − yN)− cΩ
Π+ c2Ω
ε, (A-2)
pie =
θMγGpi
Π
pi∗,G +
(
1− θM
)
γMpi
Π
pi∗ +
cθMγGy
Π
(
y∗,G − yN) , (A-3)
y = yN +
Π
Π+ c2Ω
ε. (A-4)
Special-Case Solutions without Accountability
Regime A1: Government Optimization without Accountability This regime
results in the following equilibrium equations for the deficit, inflation, inflation expecta-
tions and output:
d = d∗,G, (A-5)
pi = pi∗,G +
cγGy
γGpi
(
y∗,G − yN)− cγGy
κ
ε, (A-6)
pie = pi∗,G +
cγGy
γGpi
(
y∗,G − yN) , (A-7)
y = yN +
γGpi
κ
ε. (A-8)
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Regime A2: Independent and Unaccountable Committees The deficit, actual
inflation, inflation expectations and the output level are given by
d = d∗ − γ
M
pi γ
F
y a
ϕγFd
ε, (A-9)
pi = pi∗ − cγ
M
y
ϕ
ε, (A-10)
pie = pi∗, (A-11)
y = yN +
γMpi
ϕ
ε. (A-12)
Regime A3: Independent and Unaccountable MPC with Completely Depen-
dent FPC The resulting equation for the deficit is
d = d∗,G +
a
γGd
[
γGpi
c
(
pi∗,G − pi∗)+ γGy (y∗,G − yN)]− aωϕγGd ε. (A-13)
The inflation rate, inflation expectations and output are the same as in Regime A2.
Regime A4: Independent and Unaccountable FPC with Completely Depen-
dent MPC In this case, the deficit is given by
d = d∗ − γ
G
pi γ
F
y a
κγFd
ε. (A-14)
Actual inflation, inflation expectations and output are the same as in Regime A1.
28
Delegation of Economic Policy with Accountability
Regime B: General-Case Solution: Partial Independence with Accountability
If a large supply shock occurs and the Government overrides the decisions of the FPC
and the MPC
dG = d∗,G, (A-15)
pie = pi∗,G +
(1− α)
(
1− θM
)
γMpi κ
Λ
(
pi∗ − pi∗,G)+ cγGy
[
θMκ+ α
(
1− θM
)
ϕ
]
Λ
(
y∗,G − yN)
+
(1− α)
(
1− θM
)
cγMy κ
Λ
yN , (A-16)
piG = pi∗,G +
(1− α)
(
1− θM
)
c2γGy γ
M
pi
Λ
(
pi∗ − pi∗,G)− cγGy
κ
ε (A-17)
+
cγGy
[
Π+ c2θMγGy + αc
2
(
1− θM
)
γMy
]
Λ
(
y∗,G − yN)+ (1− α)
(
1− θM
)
(b+ c)γMy κ
Λ
yN ,
yG = yN +
(1− α)
(
1− θM
)
cγMpi
Λ
[
γGpi
(
pi∗,G − pi∗)+ cγGy (y∗,G − yN)]
+
(1− α)
(
1− θM
)
bcγMy κ
Λ
yN +
γGpi
κ
ε. (A-18)
If a small supply shock occurs and the FPC and the MPC are left to decide
dcom =
θF γGd d
∗,G +
(
1− θF
)
γFd d
∗
∆
−
a
[(
1− θM
)
θFω +
(
1− θF
)
γFy Π
]
∆ [Π + c2Ω]
ε
+
a
(
1− θM
)
γMpi
[
θFκ+ α
(
1− θF
)
c2γFy
]
∆Λ
[
γGpi
c
(
pi∗,G − pi∗)+ γGy (y∗,G − yN)] , (A-19)
pie the same as if the Government overrides ,
picom = pi∗,G +
(
1− θM
)
γMpi
(
κ− αc2γGy
)
Λ
(
pi∗ − pi∗,G)− cΩ
Π+ c2Ω
ε
+
cγGy
[
θMκ+ α
(
1− θM
)
c2γMy
]
Λ
(
y∗,G − yN)+ (1− α)
(
1− θM
)
(b+ c)γMy κ
Λ
yN , (A-20)
ycom = yN +
α
(
1− θM
)
cγMpi
Λ
[
γGpi
(
pi∗ − pi∗,G)+ cγGy (yN − y∗,G)]+ (1− α)
(
1− θM
)
bcγMy κ
Λ
yN
+
Π
Π+ c2Ω
ε. (A-21)
Special-Case Solutions with Accountability
Regime B1: Government Optimization with Accountability The results are the
same as if the Government would minimize the loss from start. In this case, the results are
the same as in Regime A1, regardless whether the committees or the Government decide.
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With complete dependence, the committees only would implement the instruments that
are determined according to Government preferences and targets.
Regime B2: Independent but Accountable Committees If a large supply shock
occurs and the Government overrides the decisions of the FPC and the MPC
dG = d∗,G, (A-22)
pie =
(1− α)κγMpi pi∗ + αϕγGpi pi∗,G
γMpi κ− αc2ω
+
c
[
(1− α)κγMy yN + αϕγGy
(
y∗,G − yN)]
γMpi κ− αc2ω
, (A-23)
piG = pi∗,G +
(1− α)c2γGy γMpi
γMpi κ− αc2ω
(
pi∗ − pi∗,G)− cγGy
κ
ε
+
cγGy
(
γMpi + αc2γMy
)
γMpi κ− αc2ω
(
y∗,G − yN)+ (1− α)(b+ c)γMy κ
γMpi κ− αc2ω
yN , (A-24)
yG = yN +
(1− α)cγMpi
γMpi κ− αc2ω
[
γGpi
(
pi∗,G − pi∗)+ cγGy (y∗,G − yN)]+ (1− α)bcγMy κγMpi κ− αc2ω yN + γ
G
pi
κ
ε.
(A-25)
If a small supply shock occurs and the FPC and the MPC are left to decide
dcom = d∗ − γ
M
pi γ
F
y a
ϕγFd
ε+
αacγMpi γ
F
y
γFd (γMpi κ− αc2ω)
[
γGpi
(
pi∗,G − pi∗)+ γGy c (y∗,G − yN)] , (A-26)
pie the same as if the Government overrides ,
picom = pi∗,G +
γMpi
(
κ− αc2γGy
)
γMpi κ− αc2ω
(
pi∗ − pi∗,G)− cγMy
ϕ
ε+
αc3γGy γ
M
y
γMpi κ− αc2ω
(
y∗,G − yN)
+
(1− α)(b+ c)γMy κ
γMpi κ− αc2ω
yN , (A-27)
ycom = yN +
(1− α)bcγMy κ
γMpi κ− αc2ω
yN +
αcγMpi
γMpi κ− αc2ω
[
γGpi
(
pi∗ − pi∗,G)+ cγGy (yN − y∗,G)]+ γMpiϕ ε.
(A-28)
Regime B3: Independent but Accountable MPC with Completely Dependent
FPC If a large supply shock occurs and the Government overrides the decision of the
MPC, the deficit, the inflation rate, inflation expectations and output are the same as in
Regime B2. If a small supply shock occurs and the MPC is left to decide
dcom = d∗,G − aω
ϕγGd
ε+
aγMpi κ
(γMpi κ− αc2ω) γGd
[
γGpi
c
(
pi∗,G − pi∗)+ γGy (y∗,G − yN)] . (A-29)
The inflation rate, inflation expectations and output are the same as in Regime B2.
Regime B4: Independent but Accountable FPC with Completely Dependent
MPC If the Government overrides, it will implement dG = d∗,G but inflation, inflation
expectations and output would be the same as if the FPC would determine its instrument
level.
30
B Summary Tables
Regime Parameter setting Without
accountability,
α = 0
With
accountability,
0 < α ≤ 1
General Case: Partial Independence 0 < θM < 1,
0 < θF < 1
Regime A Regime B
Special Cases:
Government Optimization θM = 1, θF = 1 Regime A1 Regime B1
Independent Committees θM = 0, θF = 0 Regime A2 Regime B2
Independent MPC, Dependent FPC θM = 0, θF = 1 Regime A3 Regime B3
Independent FPC, Dependent MPC θM = 1, θF = 0 Regime A4 Regime B4
Table 1: Overview of the different policy regimes depending on the degree of independence
and accountability of the committees
pie pi − pi∗
A
2, if 0 < θM < 1
2
;
or 3 if 1
2
< θM < 1
2, if 0 < θM < 1
2
;
or 3 if 1
2
< θM < 1
A1 4 4
A2 1 1
A3 1 1
A4 4 4
B dominated by A dominated by B2=B3
B1 4 =B4=A4=A1, dominated by B2=B3
B2 dominated by A2 dominated by A2=A3
B2G – =B3G dominated by B2com=B3com
B2com – =B3com dominated by A2=A3
B3 dominated by A3 =B2, dominated by A3=A2
B4 4 =B1, dominated by B2=B3
Table 2: Ranking of expected and actual inflation outcomes across policy regimes (1 - closest
to target value, 4 - largest deviation from target value)
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Regime shock stabilization target differences normal output level
pi∗,G − pi∗ > 0, y∗,G − y∗ > 0 yN
sign size (absolute value)
A A1 < A < A2 - = 1
A1 A1 < A < A2 - = 1
A2 A1 < A < A2 - = 1
A3 = A2 - = 1
A4 = A1 - = 1
BG = A1 > 0 BG < B2G B2G > BG > 1
Bcom = A < 0 Bcom < B2com = Bcom > 1
B1G = A1 - - = A1 = 1
B1com = A1 - - = A1 = 1
B2G = A1 > 0 B2G > 1
B2com = A2 < 0 = B2com > 1
B2G ≥ (≤)B2com
if α ≤ (≥)12
B3G = A1 > 0 = B2G = B2G
B3com = A2 < 0 = B2com = B2com
B4G = A1 - - = A1 = 1
B4com = A1 - - = A1 = 1
Table 3: Ranking of output outcomes across policy regimes
Regime supply shock target differences target level
sign size pi∗,G − pi∗ > 0, y∗,G − y∗ > 0
A < 0 A < A3 A2 < A < A1
A1 - - A1 > A2
A2 < 0 A2 > A4 - A1 > A2
A3 < 0 A < A3 = A1
A4 < 0 A2 > A4 - = A2
BG - - = A1
Bcom = A > 0 = A
B1G - - = A1
B1com - - = A1
B2G - - = A1
B2com = A2 B2 < B3 = A2
B3G - - = A1
B3com = A3 B2 < B3 = A3
B4G - - = A1
B4com = A4 - = A4
Table 4: Ranking of deficit outcomes across policy regimes
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